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Systemic Illusions of Justice in the Biased Courtroom
Abstract
Given the ever-growing body of evidence surrounding implicit bias in and beyond the institution
of the law, there is an equally growing need for the law to respond to the accurate science of
prejudice in its aspiration to objective practice and just decision-making. Examined herein are
the existing legal conceptualizations of implicit bias as utilized in the courtroom; implicit bias as
peripheral to law and implicit bias as effectual in law, but not without active resolution. These
views and the interventional methods, materials, and procedures they inspire are widely
employed to appreciably “un-bias” legal actors and civic participants; however, without an
accurate conceptualization of the science of prejudice in law, these interventions are likely doing
more harm than good. On the basis that these interventional techniques are unscientific in their
methodology, reliant upon a misleading theory of transparency of mind, deny the inherently
emotional and biased origin of the court, and are disseminated largely technocratically, they fail
to serve their intended purpose. In actuality, they reinforce systemic intergroup biases and are
seen to produce a lesser objective justice. This project reiterates, as with so many aspects of
justice, that there must be the same care taken in the address of those structural and institutional
contributions to implicit bias that the enterprise of law perpetuates in and of itself as have been
taken in the address of our individual cognitive predispositions toward discrimination.
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Introduction: The Injustices of Implicit Bias
It is increasingly difficult to deny the pervasive sort of prejudice that lurks in our legal
system and wider sociopolitical interactions. Indeed, the field of implicit bias research has
received a great deal of attention by and beyond the academy in recent years, accumulating an
impressive body of research1: Statistically, African American women are less likely to receive
adequate pain management medication in out-patient hospitals 2, individuals with Muslimsounding names are less likely to be invited to interview for a job when compared to those with
traditionally Anglican names irrespective of the content of their resumes 3, Asian American are
regularly regarded as less interpersonally proficient than their non-Asian peers4, women are
universally assumed to be less capable than men in positions of active leadership in the
workplace5, white children are less likely to receive disciplinary action by pre-school and
elementary educators than African American children6, African American and Hispanic drivers
are less likely to be found with contraband than white drivers but are more likely to be stopped,
searched, and arrested for contraband-related offenses7, and on and on.
These evidences likewise and inevitably spill into the realm of the court: Individuals with

See J. Kang, et al. “Implicit Bias in the Courtroom,” UCLA Law Review 59, 1124-86 (2012); B. Nosek, et al.
“Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes,” European Review of Social Psychology 18,
36-54 (2007); D. Faigman, et al. “Implicit Bias in the Courtroom,” UCLA Law Review 59, 1124-86 (2012).
2
See K. M. Hoffman, et al. “Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment Recommendations and False Beliefs
about Biologic Differences between Blacks and Whites,” PNAS 113, 4296-301 (2016).
3
See D. Widner and S. Chicoine, “It’s All in the Name: Employment Discrimination against Arab Americans,”
Sociological Forum 26, 806-23 (2011).
4
See F. Leong and T. Hayes, “Occupational Stereotyping of Asian Americans,” The Career Development Quarterly
39, 143-54 (1990).
5
See A. Eagly and S. Karau, “Role Congruity Theory in Prejudice toward Female Leaders,” Psychological Review
109, 573-98 (2002).
6
See United States Government Accountability Office, ed. “Discipline Disparities for Black Students, Boys, and
Students with Disabilities,” Government Accountability Highlights, K-12 Education Report, 18-258 (2018).
7
See E. Pierson, et al. “A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops across the United States,”
Stanford Open Policing Project Database, 1-23 (2017).
1
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prominently Afrocentric features receive longer criminal sentences than those without 8; women
are more likely to be jailed for drug-related offenses than men9; American Indian and Alaskan
Native juveniles are more likely to be sentenced in adult court than any other demographic10;
non-white jurors stand twice as likely to be removed from their jury pool11. Especially when
silhouetted against such stark evidence, it becomes equally difficult to deny the need for
something, anything, to curtail the felt effects of implicit bias.
In light of this, the law, now more than ever, has an urgent obligation to understand the
nature of the assumptions of prejudice it makes in the pursuit of a normatively and objectively
‘unbiased’ system12. That obligation seemingly centers on the thoughtful address of
discrimination in the courtroom as both a cognitive and institutional phenomenon. The existing
narrative of bias goes as so: when it is agreed to be problematic, it is agreed to be problematic at
the level of the individual, and to resolve it is eliminate it from the decision-making processes of
that individual. The narrative assumes what Linda Krieger calls “transparency of mind”13, what
Jerry Kang calls “behavioral realism” 14, or what Albert Dzur calls “civic dignity” 15 – that we
have the ability to be less biased by simply being less biased, more aware, and more attuned to
the ways we exercise our prejudices. It seemingly dismisses the systemic and structural

See I. Blair, et al. “The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing,” Psychological Science
15, 674-9 (2004).
9
See S. Covington and B. Bloom, “Gendered Justice: Women in the Criminal Justice System” in Gendered Justice:
Addressing Female Offenders, 3-25 (2003).
10
See M. Leiber, “A Comparison of Juvenile Court Outcomes for Native Americans, African Americans, and
Whites,” Justice Quarterly 11, 257-79 (1994).
11
See B. O’Brien and C. Grosso, “Report of Jury Selection Study,” University of Michigan College of Law Digital
Commons, 1-17 (2011).
12
J. West, “12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias,” Harvard Journal on Racial and Ethnic Justice 72,
165-204 (2011) at 166.
13
L. Krieger, “The Content of our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity,” Stanford Law Review 47, 1161-1248 (1994) at 1167.
14
J. Kang and M. Banaji, “Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of Affirmative Action,” California Law
Review 94, 1063-118 (2006) at 1064-5.
15
A. Dzur, Punishment, Participatory Democracy, and the Jury, Oxford University Press, 2012 at 115.
8
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contributions to bias 16 and ignores the impoverished cognitive access each of us has to our
biases, irrelevant of our intentions. As will be discussed, this flatfooted conception of prejudice
in practice and in law has gone on to produce a lesser objective justice.
It is at this moment that the newest wave of the Implicit Revolution 17 is, I believe,
entering the foreground of the court. The entirety of modern law’s arsenal against (explicit)
prejudice – an arsenal inherited from Civil Rights-era discrimination law – predates the science,
even the vocabulary, of today’s kinds of implicit biases by decades. It is generally by these ill
conceptions of the evidentiary standards of intent and the folk psychology or popular science
understanding of the brain and behavior that the law continues to attempt to mediate prejudices 18.
From here the problem is further compounded as this distilled folk understanding is rarely seen
to translate in full from its origin in science to its application in the courtroom 19. The
jurisprudential construction of prejudice in law and order is an overtly emotional, motivated,
“consciously” cognitive phenomenon, a circumstantial choice that intends and impels; this
provisional approximation and the living breathing version of it in the world – the version the
law purports to represent20 – exist now on entirely different, ever-divergent planes.
The first section of this paper seeks to address just this: I aim to devote sufficient space
within which to lay side by side the science and the law in hopes of fashioning a wider view of
contemporary bias and prejudice and those functions, conceptualized in law versus in reality.

C. Lawrence, “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,” Stanford Law
Review 39, 317-88 (1987) at 321-3.
17
The Implicit Revolution is the emergence of the science of unconsciousness, including implicit bias, and ushered
in the study of prejudice and science in law as we know it now. For a comprehensive history of the Implicit
Revolution of psychological, cognitive, and neurosciences, see A. Greenwald and M. Banaji, “The Implicit
Revolution: Reconceiving the Relation between Conscious and Unconscious,” American Psychologist 72, 861-71
(2017) and J. Kang, “ Trojan Horses of Race,” Harvard Law Review 118, 1489-1593 (2005) at 1514.
18
Krieger, “Content,” at 1166-77.
19
J. Kane, “Integrity, Conscience, and Science,” in Nomos vol. XL: Integrity and Conscience, University of New
York Press (1998), at 115-134.
20
Krieger, “Content,” at 1217-8.
16
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This section puts forth a more nuanced discussion of the working legal view – what I have called
the “holdover” view – of bias, that attends to the foremost objections of implicit bias reform,
including those surrounding the normative structure of anti-discrimination law. I then take up
what is perhaps the more cooperative middle-ground or “interventional” view to clarify the
problematic use of implicit bias science in law. The subsequent section offers a look at bias in
action, namely through the role of juries and the bias “grooming” techniques currently in place in
the voir dire and judgement processes. These bias-grooming techniques and the cases in which
they are used call into question whether efforts put forth by law to reconcile the (disheartening)
scientific realities of bias with objectivity and subjectivity are worthwhile at all. I argue that,
though they respond to the common sense initiatives for a more impartial, “conscious”, and
objective court, they are doomed to be self-defeating, theoretically and practically, and produce a
lesser objective justice that reinforces prejudice in law. These first tentative, optimistic steps
forward may in fact be doing more harm than good.

What We Mean When We Say Bias
When we talk about bias in law now, we largely do not talk about contemporary science.
We talk about the stance taken by litigants and judges reflective instead of that outdated social
psychology of 1980s academy science 21. It is a science that deals in the sociological (not
necessarily cognitive) science of ‘stereotyping’, talks about intergroup biases as normatively
motivated, and discounts memory research, among other things. When we do talk about bias in
law through contemporary science, it becomes far more telling.
For a moment, divorce the notion of bias as prejudice or emotion: As far as the cognitive

21

Krieger, “Content,” at 1174-6.

Roderique, 7

sciences are concerned, bias references the mechanical processes by which the brain makes sense
of the huge overabundance of stimuli that it receives at a given time. These are processes of
categorization and schema-development that are necessary to combat this massively disparate
gap between the amount of stimuli we process and receive, which occurs, by conservative
measure, at a rate of 50 chunks (pieces of information) to ten million per second 22. The brain is
biased to operate in the most efficient means, so bias, most simply (1) regulates and filters what
of that overload of stimuli is attended to23; (2) discerns and constructs meaning from sparse or
unreliable stimuli, as in the case of novel or unfamiliar experience 24; (3) acts upon information
and stimulates predictive action most quickly and efficiently; and (4) aids in governing the
processes of memory activation and retention.
If viewed along the lines of these four basic functions, a corresponding twin picture of
prejudice emerges more clearly: (1) regulation and filtering can be somewhat arbitrary and
stimuli that goes un-attended may in fact be useful; (2) contextual constructions can be an
illusory process in which the assumptions made by the brain as based on experience may be false
or nonexistent; (3) the efficiency by which the brain acts upon information may be to the
detriment of the most beneficial or productive choice, especially when the neurosensory
processes are at the mercy of ‘instinctual’ or psychologic responses25; and (4) memory processes
are, among the brain’s mechanics, wildly unreliable, errorful, and porous to corruption by other
cognitive functions, leading to potential compounding of biases at the point of later retrieval 26.

22

Reference Cognitive Information Processing Theory.
As with mood-congruency effects, base rate fallacies, frequency illusions, confirmation biases, etc. For more on
this, reference The Cognitive Biases Codex.
24
As with pareidolia, placebo effects, cross-race effects, denomination effects, projection biases, etc.
25
As with conjunction fallacies, decoy effects, unity biases, trait ascription biases, the Dunning-Kruger effect, etc.
26
As with misattribution errors, primacy and recency effects, Google effects, misinformation effects, cryptomnesia,
etc.
23
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Such potential deficiencies in the mechanism of bias can devolve into what is widely
conceptualized as “prejudice” (that is, negative and discriminatory judgement), and that
prejudice, being so closely tied to the brain’s regulatory process of bias, can devolve into
something extremely difficult to suppress or avoid, if not impossible. Bias is foundational to
prejudice in the same way that marketing is foundational to capitalism, but it is important to note
the two are not synonymous. Further, bias is not a ‘learned’ contextualization of identity in the
same way racism or sexism is, both schemas we inescapably absorb from the world around us.
Given the ways our social identities are increasingly complicated, inter-associative, and
intersecting, the transformation of bias has been from labored to automatic and from blatant to
ubiquitous. These processes of bias are examined in the science as being at the level of implicit
(colloquially, “unconsciously”) or explicit (“consciously”). Explicit biases – what Civil Rightsera legislation deals with – are those we recognize as such and choose to make expressed or
unexpressed. Implicit biases – what I am concerned with – are those veiled from ourselves
because we are unable to access them from the same level of consciousness that created them.
This simplification is all to say, when bias and prejudice are illustrated in science as
distinct phenomena – prejudice being the discriminatory one of the two – their distinction
becomes noticeably lacking in the corresponding legal literature 27; bias, prejudice,
discrimination, discriminatory intent, assumptions, emotions, fears, stereotypes, perceptions, etc.
are falsely used interchangeably. It may seem an inappreciable one, but it aims at the heart of the
problem, where it is exactly these kinds of distinctions – between bias and prejudice, between
implicit and explicit, between motivation and intentionality, between the burden of proof and the
burden of production – that muddies the waters of legal decision-making and public perception.

27

See Faigman, et al., “Courtroom,” (2012).
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Bias textures our experiential understanding of the world: It itself is not discriminatory, it cannot
be “consciously” identified by the individual, and it is not a mediated choice 28. Implicit bias is
even less so identifiable by the individual, to the point of being so covertly persistent as to
potentially modify the individual’s neurochemistry over time29. Prejudice, in the sense of
litigious prejudice, is confined to performative discrimination, the likes of which are clearly seen
in Title VII disparate treatment language; however, implicit biases do not necessarily align with
our explicit ones, or those that we chose to endorse. This is also to say that bias is not contained
exclusively within the walls of our brains: Implicit bias is nearly as much a cognitive
phenomenon as it is a systemic one reflective of the proliferation of prejudice throughout our
institutional and social lives30. What the law lacks, among other things, is an understanding that
our biases and prejudices, those very conceptions and ideals, are not entirely, not “consciously”
our own.
So, when we talk about bias and the law, we are talking about the Titanic’s iceberg: It’s
foolhardy to think that the tools of the court can even being to spot what rests below the surface,
and what may seem as belaboring this distinction is only a necessary illumination of accurate
science. When unpacked from the legal amalgam of emotionality, it is these kinds of implicit
prejudices – and the bias-grooming techniques derived from their science – that are legitimately
threatening to justice-making. Without an accurately informed conception of implicit bias and
prejudice, bias-grooming in the court becomes a self-defeating exercise in shadowboxing an
invisible adversary.

Krieger, “Content,” at 1167.
See B. Cheon, et al. “Contribution of Serotonin Transporter Polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) to Automatic Racial
Bias,” Personality and Individual Differences 79, 35-38 (2015).
30
See Lawrence, “The Id,” (1987).
28
29
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To Be Bias-Free
Anyone on this side of Brown v. Board of Education 31 is likely to concede that behavioral
sciences do inform the citizen public and therefore do for better or worse inform the law.
Dismissing what seems to be, at least to me, the obviously unfounded notion of non-bias – that
we are all absolutely objective and omnisciently impartial – there are generally left two ideas as
to how this occurs in specific regard to prejudice; the “holdover” formalist view and the common
sense “interventional” view.

The Holdover View of Bias
The holdover view of bias – a holdover from Civil Rights-era jurisprudence – puts forth
the view that the law is right to reject prejudice and bias on the basis that the law should not or
cannot change32. The former objection, that the law should not accommodate a scientific view of
prejudice, presses uneasily against evidence to the contrary. On and on, there is so much
evidence of racial discrimination in jury selection 33; that voir dire instruction produces and
reproduces ethnic and classist prejudice34; of inflamed partisanship in the court, on the bench, in
the chambers 35. It exists in every facet of the process 36; CSI and forensic analyses, testimony and

31

347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown’s footnote 11 was a crucial reframing of the applicability of science in law, and make
room for the use of social science in the colloquial understanding beyond law and the formal understanding within
law. Despite questions of the quality of the then-science it was based upon, the impact of footnote 11 continues to be
profoundly felt in legal theory and practice. See also Lawrence, “The Id,” at 350-1, 362-3.
32
See West, “12 Racist Men,” (2011).
33
B. O’Brien and C. Grosso, “Report on Jury Selection Study,” University of Michigan College of Law Digital
Commons, 1-17 (2011) at 11-17.
34
West, “12 Racist Men” at 188-93.
35
Krieger, “Content,” at 1226.
36
See Faigman, et al., “Courtroom,” (2012).
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in the language of proof, jury selection37, jury deliberation38, judicial education39, sentencing
procedure40, precedent, legislation, language, reason, and right 41. Likewise, we can look to the
language of mens rea, culpability, scrutiny, admission, intent, so on, to recognize that the law
lacks remedy for the probabilistic nature of prejudice42. If for no other reason than to insulate the
law from avoidable mismemory biases or the unnecessary corruption of juvenile witnesses, as
but two examples, it is in the interest of the legal practice to absorb the impact of evidence in
brain sciences (At the time of writing, Black’s Law admits four types of bias; the Association of
Psychological Science admits almost 200). The holdover view defends law as a bastion of
excusable raced and gendered and classed inequalities 43. More pointedly, it shelters those who
benefit from the law as an enterprise of discrimination, and from the systemic prejudice it
reinforces in its judgements 44.
Thinking that the law need not accommodate science in this way is a stance quickly
dimming as the law becomes a more intensely politicized, economical machine. If there is merit
to be extracted from the holdover view, it is from the latter objection – that the law is unable to
accommodate such science. The rub is this: science begins with fact, law ends with fact. Science,
even with evidences as well established as those listed, cannot grant the kind of certainty law
requires to take as fact45. (Also for this reason, the law cannot be treated as purely as a scientific

37

D. Devine, Jury Decision Making: The State of Science, New York University Press (2012) at 41-60.
Ibid at 152-80.
39
See S. Strong, “Judicial Education and Regulatory Capture: Does the Current System of Educating Judges
Promote a Well-Functioning Judiciary and Adequately Serve the Public Interest?” Journal of Dispute Resolution
2015, 1-22 (2015).
40
Devine, Jury, at 68-90.
41
See J. Armour, “Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit,” California
Law Review 83, 733-72 (1995).
42
W. Dimock, “Rules of Law, Laws of Science,” Yale Journal of Law & Humanities 13, 203-25 (2001) at 204.
43
Armour, “Stereotypes,” at 734-50.
44
Lawrence, “The Id,” at 336-44.
45
Dimock, “Rules” at 215-20.
38
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methodology or civic technocracy46.) However, when bias is at least acknowledged dually as a
cognitive and institutional phenomenon, not a normative motivation, the law that surrounds it
becomes more mutable and forgiving 47. There have been demonstrated ways in which the law
may be read and exercised that do not require it to fundamentally change or fundamentally
readdress its certainty principles but nonetheless accommodates a more accurate science48.
Materializing this kind of gatekeeping decision49, in Title VII legal language and beyond, is a
realistic next step in the modernizing the holdover view.

The Interventional View of Bias
If the holdover view states that the law should not acknowledge the science of prejudice,
the interventional view swings the pendulum the other direction to say that the law might resolve
the whole of the problem of prejudice. What has been offered by legal theorists 50 and actors is a
surface-level and only partially-informed idiomatic view of implicit bias. Despite the evidence
already accumulated, there persists in the wider social narrative (in the popular science
understanding) a notion of transparent or privileged access to one’s cognitive mechanisms of

46

Ibid at 205-6.
Krieger, “Content,” at 1171-2.
48
Instances of this kind of re-reading of the law are seen in Title VII cases Kimble v. Wisconsin Dept. of Workforce
Development and McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch Co.; both judgements saw concepts of in-group bias, uncertainty
principles, mis-memory reliability, stereotyping, and so on, in the vein of the interventional view (below), freely
cited. The language of Title VII on disparate treatment – language which upon closer inspection trades conscious
intent for actionable causation, a more realistic application of implicit bias science – serves to illuminate the ways in
which the law may be read as more consistent with an ever-evolving science, without compromising precedent.
Kimble ruled in concurrence with Title VII discrimination; McReynolds did not: Both cases, however, mark a huge
departure from what is usually seen of the holdover view, and establish that intentionality does not any longer need
to be tied to “conscious” intent (i.e., bias as a choice), and the burden of proof shifts away from the burden of
production of motivation. This mindful re-reading does not jeopardize the rule of law nor require the judgement to
admit extralegal heuristics, and moves a step closer to an accurate reflection of the science of prejudice by law in
practice. See Kimble v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development 690 F. Supp.2d 765 (E.D. Wis. 2010) and
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. 11 7th Cir. 3639 (2012).
49
See R. Harris, Black Robes, White Coats: The Puzzle of Judicial Policymaking and Scientific Evidence, Rutgers
University Press: New Brunswick (1972), at 7-12.
50
Those referenced herein including Kang, Krieger, Greenwald, Freeman, Lawrence, and others.
47
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bias as allowing for intervention in the exercise of the resulting implicit bias. Within this
narrative, the answers already seem to exist: through mindfulness and an increased awareness,
the individual is capable of making himself appreciably less biased, effectively mediating his
cognitive processes and subduing the felt effects of institutionally-born discrimination. Markets
and media are reflective of this, being saturated with “4 Signs Racism may be an Issue in Your
Workplace”51, “Bias-Proof Your Classroom Today”52, “A Fix for Gender Bias in Healthcare?
Check!”53, and (most ambitiously) “10 Steps to Overcome Unconscious Bias” 54. I am, as are
many, skeptical that awareness – or thoughtfulness, or thoroughness, or intention – is ever
enough a situation as this. That there is such a movement toward engaging in our individual
subjectivity is not so much the problem as are the ways in which an interventional approach
curtails hope for policy implementation, precedential change, or accountability from those
institutions most readily perpetuating our systemic prejudices. To reiterate, implicit bias is not a
cognitive choice, but a product of joint cognitive mechanics and institutional exposure:
Because we so readily assume that people have privilege access to the content of their
own thought processes, we may easily overlook the significance of this assumption of
decisionmaker self-awareness. But if one thinks about it, one must immediately recognize
the normative utility of a rule prohibiting discrimination depends entirely on the
decisionmaker self-awareness. One can refrain from “discriminating” only to the extent
that one can accurately identify the factors impelling one’s actions or desires. Absent
decisionmaker self-awareness, the nondiscrimination principle – if framed as a
prohibitory injunction “not to discriminate” – loses its normative mooring. 55

Implicit Association Tests (IAT) and other implicit bias measure are more accurate at predicting

J. Haughton, “4 Signs Racism may be an Issue in Your Workplace,” Chartered Management Institute (12 May
2016).
52
E. Hopkins and G. Thompson, Scholastic Teaching Content, “Bias-Proof Your Classroom,” Instructor 117, no. 4,
32 (2008).
53
J. Nordell, “A Fix for Gender Bias in Healthcare? Check!” The New York Times (11 January 2017).
54
N. Goodman, “10 Steps to Overcome Unconscious Bias,” Association for Talent Development (2014).
55
Krieger, ”Content,” at 1186.
51
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certain types of behavioral schemas, including racism, sexism, ableism, an on, than explicit bias
or self-report measures56. That this is the case cannot be understated: It points to, as accessibly as
can be, that even the most introspective or informed among us cannot predict our biases or
extinguish our prejudices57. Recall here that biases, especially implicit biases, cannot be thought
away exactly because they are foundational to our decision-making processes. They are integral
to our cognitive functionality and are essentially inaccessibly by the kind of mindfulness these
fixes champion; at best, mindfulness is a post hoc runaround circling the issue, never meeting it
directly.
My stance here – that implicit bias is the un-slayable dragon to our knights of law and
order – moves a step further than the theory offered in compliment to the interventional view.
Where Krieger, Freeman, and Kang put forth that the implicit biases we harbor regardless of any
contrary intention must be muzzled through further and greater intervention58, I venture that an
interventional approach is somewhat futile. Implicit, or indeed explicit, bias is largely resultant
of the political structuring and social performance of identity. The interventional view discounts
not only the necessary nuances of implicit bias as cognitively foundational, but the confluence of
cognitive mechanisms acting in reaction to systemic racism, sexism, and other prejudices. This
overwhelming focus at the level of the individual – like calls for greater detection and screening
of bias or selective modulation of decision-making conditions to deter biased tendencies – fails
almost entirely to confront the social and historical impulses of discrimination. This misguided
relationship between the brain and behavior is alternatively illustrated in the theory as a

L. Rudman, et al. “’Unlearning’ Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, 856-68 (2001) at 856-8; Kang, “Trojan Horses” at 1512-5.
57
Including and especially those involved in the science: We do not pass IAT’s with any greater degree of
impartiality than first-time testers, we only become privy to its predictive pattering and correlations.
58
See Kang, “Trojan Horses,” (2005).
56
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perpetrator-victim relationship, wherein
the perpetrator perspective sees [discrimination] not as conditions, but as actions, or
series of actions, inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator. The focus is more on what
particular perpetrators have done or are doing to some victims that it is on the overall life
situation of the victim class. The victim, or “condition”, conception of [discrimination]
suggests that the problem will not be solved until the conditions associated with it have
been eliminated. To remedy the condition of [discrimination] would demand affirmative
efforts to change the condition. The remedial dimension of the perpetrator perspective,
however, is negative. The task is merely to neutralize the inappropriate conduct of the
perpetrator.59
In the pursuit of a normatively ‘unbiased’ legal actor, be they judge or juror, the law on the
whole continues to wrongly buttress the perpetrator perspective, and with it the systemic
prejudices and implicit attitudes that find continued traction in the Petrazyckian lifeworld.

False Aspirations of Objectivity
Both the holdover and interventional view of prejudice and science in law illuminate the
chief expectation in law of some normative equality, or achievable objective outcome. In either
dismissing (holdover view) or resolving (interventional view) matters of bias there remains an
underlying basis of prejudice in the court – that is, a biased and emotional court is inevitable
(otherwise, these views would struggle to arise at all). I find it difficult to accept, when we
acknowledge this implicitly biased nature of the court and its civic participants, the illusion that
there might be objectively right or equitable answers beyond the subjective discretion of legal
actors 60 and decision-makers. An objective jury is in direct conflict with engaged civic
participation. The injustice born from the maintenance of an illusory and counterproductive

A. Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Cases,” Minnesota Law Review 62, 1049-1119 (1978) at 1053, emphasis added.
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aspiration to objectivity is the unifying thread between both views, especially as
we take into account the negative implications about human capacity [and] civic dignity.
The recognition of a person as a responsible member of a collective…[contradicts] the
more than two centuries of egalitarian and emancipatory political action that shaped the
institutions of Western democracies, most recently through the efforts of civil rights
social movements.61
It seems a paradox then that an egalitarian, emancipatory democracy should also call for civic
participation that defers to a ‘right’ answer, or at least to one predetermined by the subjectivity of
its ever-biased decision-makers 62. I situate this at the crux of the difficulty in theoretically and
practically reconciling social order – represented by jurors – with legal rules – judges – in the
performative discourse of the courtroom63. Not only that, but too the reconciliation of the
adversarial model of justice when juries are increasingly placed at the center of a triangulation
between proof, precedent, and economy. (Juries, tradition tells us, are a moral arbiter, not
determinant of guilt in adversarial justice.) The use of juries, and all of the unique particulars
surrounding their use in the courtroom, present a concise model of bias-interactions that
exemplify most clearly, I believe, the ways in which the legal tradition has failed to adequately
address the science of prejudice. In the same breath, so too has it failed to fully realize the
capacity of the jury body and their being autonomously subjective and critical; a symbolic,
prescribed, or otherwise unengaged jury undercuts the role of civic participation in the court. The
mere maintenance of an impossibly objective ideal of implicit bias in the courtroom and in the
jury, as from either the holdover or the interventional view, appreciably makes justice less
objective.
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The Case for Juries, Just Not Expert Ones
It has been my experience that dialogues surrounding implicit bias decision-making in the
courtroom also include discussion as to the very need for the (human) jury: Why not eliminate
entirely Aristophanes’ mortal quality of law 64? Aside from the imaginable logistical limitations,
any alternative process invites equally as many biases into the court (statistical, mechanical,
computational, interpretational, representational, etc. 65). The institution of the jury, as it exists
now, aligns with both of the touchstone functions of the rule of law; to “hold governing officials
to the law” (the vertical function) and to “resolve disputes between citizens according to the law”
(the horizontal function)66. The jury represents a unique kind of transmorphing of citizen
responsibility:
Voters never have the individual offenders before their eyes; they are never in a position
to feel the Montequieian impulse toward mercy. Ordinary voters are never capable of the
routinized, sober, and merciful approach to punishment that is the stuff of the daily work
of punishment professionals. 67
When civic dignity is confronting and participatory in this way, it moves from a plebiscitary or
advocatory model of participation68 to a more direct and pointed engagement with legal decisionmaking – what is called ‘load-bearing participation’ 69. Load-bearing participation is more
directly engaged because it allows for and requires a greater exercise of subjectivity and
responsibility on the part of the juror. Jury-less justice, or even systems lite on load-bearing
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forms of participation, runs the steep risk of undermining the perceived legitimacy of the
objective legal system70.
A more operative iteration of this jury-less stance is the argument for expert juries, either
in the case of experts as jurors or jurors as needing an acquired expertise71. Expert systems of
judicial decision-making may be argued in a strong and weak form 72. In the strong form, the
expert benefits over and above the layperson in his knowledge, which affords him the ability to
“nullify” his passions; he is simply better outfitted to do objective justice than the common juror.
In the weak form, the system of justice is so equipped, not the individual. Of these, however, the
strong form is
less defensible than it might appear and leads to an unappealing loss of [civic dignity],
among other hazards. [The weak form] is less reliant on the dominant role for
professionals and experts than is often thought and indeed demands more rather than less
citizen involvement. 73
Expert systems of justice therein demonstrate a counterproductive and rightly cautions view of
scientific idolatry and cloistered technocracy – those tendencies that also draw out law-as-ascience arguments74. Without accountability from non-expert legal actors, the institution is free
to become recursively insular (as has been seen in the sciences), where any decision-making is
based purely on the subjective discretion of its decision-makers. In either of these jury-less
pictures, the call for jurors to be separated from their subjectivity as civilians is problematic:
Jurors cannot be only confined to a prescriptive objectivity of law, nor should they be any more
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removed from the process of decision-making than any other actor. Empirically and
theoretically, the jury becomes most unreliable and unproductive when it is only a symbolic
exercise of engagement with the law75. The jury as it exists now may not be the most efficient
means of load-bearing participation, but it is nonetheless an effective and legitimizing
intervention between the vertical and horizontal functions of the law 76.

Bias-Grooming
Bias-grooming techniques appear throughout our social and legal institutions. Relevant to
the court, the American Bar Association has its “Achieving an Impartial Jury Toolbox”, a sixty
page review published in 2014 as a part of its Implicit Bias Initiative that includes resources like
“Ten Quick Tips for De-Biasing” and a “Mindful Courtroom Checklist”. The National Center for
State Courts and the State Justice Institute have each instituted their educational pilot programs
that zero in on an optimistic and highly sanitized neuroscience. Even Starbucks mandated
nationwide racial-bias training at an eight-figure cost that borrows much of the same science in
much of the same way77. Techniques range in scale and scope from surveys to orientation
materials to workshops and trainings to research access to intervention and advising resources,
aimed at every level of the court but concentrated at the level of civic participants. It is important
to note that these initiatives, though created for institutional-level reform, are a means of
individual reformation at explicit levels of prejudice; they almost exclusively approach (in design
and/or in practice) implicit bias through the mistakenly virtuous lens of the interventional view 78-
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which is to say, through an ineffectual consciousness-raising of the individual without regard to
institutional influence. To them I have four main objections.
First, the normative objectivity sought through bias-grooming is not entirely possible
without bias or even prejudice. Even without inviting complications of philosophy or legal
theory, we see that rational or objective decision-making is impaired or inhibited at the
neurostructural level absent functional emotive centers of the brain79. More macro but neurologic
all the same, for example, is the use of photography in the court, a fairly well-represented facet
of legal psychology. Photographic evidence as presented to a jury is the single most persuasive
piece of indirect evidence that can be admitted 80. Everything from the OJ Simpson blood
evidence to the minute-by-minute coverage of the Sayfullo Saipov terror attack in 2017,
gruesome or graphic crime scene photos reliably invoke a heightened emotive, cognitive, and
prejudicial response from legal actors regardless of experience or familiarity. This is above and
beyond the effects of even the most personally effecting testimony and may be on its own
responsible for increased punitiveness in juror and judge decision-making. Emotionally
antagonized judgements as these are seen to result in lesser (actively) effortful, and thus less
reliable, cognition81. Here, increased emotional salience reflexively motivates juror positiverehabilitation and (increased) negative-retribution schemas, predisposing jurors to follow the
lead of their implicit biases. Objections to include photography in the court echo objections to
emotionality, but the law is hard-pressed to go without either: There is no rational or reasonable
means by which the court can referee the exercise (or exclusion) of emotionality or provide an
emotionally-predetermined environment within which to conduct justice. Though we see from
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the science that some ideal emotionality may reduce biased judgement, bias-grooming has little –
if any – capacity to enforce that.
My second objection lies within the very conceptualization of these types of techniques
and the stereotype-congruence they emphasize 82. Bias-grooming is ineffectual because it so
deeply rooted in interventional notion of transparency of mind on the part of the individual. This
a perfunctory pathologizing of the individual (the actor) without healing the system (the law),
and the system must be attended to with equally as much fervor. Racism discrimination, as just
one specific bias, is a systemic, socially- and historically-integrated pandemic that moves far
beyond the singular individual83 – recall here the perpetrator perspective. IAT-related evidence
quantifies that bias against African Americans is held nearly equally by Caucasians as by African
Americans. Asian Americans are biased against Asian Americans to a lesser but similar degree,
and the same goes for Hispanic populations. Similar cases can be made for gender and sexuality
prejudices, age, religion, class, and more 84. Prejudice itself has splintered away from the
individual, so as long as the focus of these techniques remains on the individual, they miss the
mark. They take up only part of a problem that forever continues to find ammunition elsewhere,
in greater and equal measure85.
Third is that, though they claim a scientific understanding of bias and prejudice, these
techniques are by and large unscientific. These materials do not abide by conventions of followup study for subsequent intervention to adapt and modify them; without this kind of longitudinal
attention and accountability, they are relatively worthless to the wider picture of bias-‘reduction’.
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They often politicize topical issues of identity like race and sex, given their proximity to the
politicization of the judiciary; this generally diminishes their autonomy and ability to be
responsible to burgeoning science. The implementation of these techniques and materials is in no
way regulated, so when left as a discretionary matter, there is little incentive for them to be
included at all; the practical scope of bias-grooming (through duration, participation, or
regularity) is extremely limited, so much so that it is too subtle a cognitive manipulation to
establish any lasting effects 86. The language of these materials typically falls on the side furthest
away from clinical legalese (so far away it is beyond merely making them more accessible); as
above, this is a disservice to the necessary complexities of both science and law, and
underestimates and undermines the capacity of the juror to engage with either. These techniques
ostensibly draw from the very inequalities they seek to dispel; to reduce prejudice, jurors are
faced with an unexpected crucible of admitting their own implicit attitudes (something, as least
in our current political and social climate, I would certainly argue that most people are unwilling
to advertise to a room of their colleagues or fellow jurors during one of these workshops 87. There
is ample latitude within these techniques where individuals may hide, and in keeping the
dialogue of prejudice sterilized in this way, they continue to perpetuate the notion of objectively
‘fixable’ prejudices88, thus reinforcing the opacity of existing intergroup and implicit biases 89).
Each of these is another hitch in a worthy quest for a lesser prejudiced law and only distances
law further still from the accurate science necessary to do so. Even from the interventional view,
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these interventions are not robust enough.
Finally, I take issue with the technocratic means by which these kinds of bias-grooming
methods have arisen90. I have established the harms of an exclusively expert system and have
reiterated the common-sensical and theoretical issue that juries cannot be (expected to be)
experts. As with those, there are considerable limitations and cautions that come with biasgrooming and diversity training. The science these initiatives are based on is itself problematic as
it is, of course, a culturally bound way of knowing, and represents a matrix of intersectional
injustices in representation, interpretation, coercive and selective involvement, and so on.
Scientific empiricism as a human enterprise, particularly when applied to the law, exacerbates all
too easily testimonial and hermeneutical oppressions 91. Moreover, the industry that is diversity
and inclusion initiatives is, while facially neutral, an industry nonetheless: Diversity workshops
and implicit bias seminars are a privatized and (extremely) profitable capitalization upon a
never-ending need, a need that that industry can and does predictively modulate to produce
further need and further gain. These techniques groom away the official, endorsed, agreed types
of racism or sexism as a sort of ideological scapegoat instead of legitimately challenging the
discrimination occurring among us 92.
The law displaces it due responsibility and accountability for prejudice to institutional
and systemic prejudices outside of the court, but it is not alone in the pervasion of bias –
technocratic civics and democratized science are both culpable. For this weight to rest entirely on
the knowledge-producers of the academy, or on the citizen public, is unreasonable 93. Though the
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statistics are still infantile, these four objections offer some direction as to why bias-reduction
techniques have not been seen to produce the expected longitudinal change in the court.

In Action
Some of the most noteworthy of these bias-grooming techniques in the court are the ABA
Implicit Bias Initiative and implicit bias training videos by the District Court of Washington, for
jurors, and by the Association’s Diversity and Inclusion 360 Commission, for judges, public
defenders, and prosecutors. In examining these with a finer tooth, the above objections are seen
in action.
The ABA’s Implicit Bias Toolbox (IBT)94 and “Achieving an Impartial Jury” Toolbox
(AIJ)95, released initially in 2013, can be linked to more emblematic diversity training-type
resources. They are often paired together, the IBT being the more peripheral and the AIJ being
more essential to the work of jury selection and judgement, and both are focused on the ABA’s
claim of ‘de-biasing’ and making objective jurors at work. Both are designed to be implemented
at the discretion of legal leaders, actors, and teachers, and neither require or are designed to
include a scientific or academic presence during the training or administration of the training (the
AIJ in fact does not necessarily require any administrator and can be utilized by the individual
alone) (objection four). Both rely upon the interventional view of transparency of mind and
much of the heavy lifting to expose bias and this transparency of mind to the participant is done
through IAT testing96 (objection two). Even with an ideally transparent mind, they attempt to
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leverage and compartmentalize implicit bias: The AIJ specifically exploits many of the
administrator’s and participant’s existing intergroup biases, over-contextualizes social
information processing, and excuses, utilizes, and furthers informal stereotyping of participants
and courts when that stereotyping mitigates more formal discriminatory action (objection one) 97.
Not for naught, the ABA’s Toolboxes do include some valid points. As compared to the
interventional view of bias, the IBT and AIJ are certainly more informed by relevant and topical
science98. Nevertheless, both tools significantly overestimate their own efficacy over time, again
attributable in part to their lack of (legitimately) scientific bases (objection three). When the
court does utilize bias-grooming techniques, they are designed to be mandatory, prescriptive, and
one-sided. Here I take a page from Starbucks’ book and examine this in terms of the diversity
training most widely seen in business: Diversity training is highly effective in theory99 and
highly ineffective in practice100. Any long-term improvement in hiring or recruitment – mirrored
in jury selection and decision-making – is typically negligible over time and, when training is
made mandatory, workplace effects are null, if not (more likely) negative 101. This may well be
due to those same issues of conceptualization seen in the above objections. To summarize,
diversity training is ineffective because it assumes transparency of mind, occurs exclusively at
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the level of the individual consciousness, and requires that individual to reframe and focus his
prejudices on intergroup relations 102, usually at the detriment of singling out a particular group
within that schema like women or African Americans 103. His subjectivity becomes clinical and
legalistic in its prescriptive terms, and any longitudinal accountability that is successfully
embedded is repercussive or socially threatening. (Compare this with the typical diversity
taskforce: the former is commonly conducted by some authority outside of the institution, uses
contractually for-profit science, is contextually independent of the institution, and implemented
consequences are made public, while the latter is in-house, entirely contextually dependent, is
integrated into the economy of the institution, and its consequences are normally focused inward
within that institution. It should not come as a surprise that task forces are usually the more
longitudinally successful of the two104, nor that the ABA’s existing narratives are far more
likened to trainings than taskforces.) When ‘de-biasing’ techniques
eliminate people’s freedom to value diversity on their own terms, they may actually be
creating hostility toward the targets of prejudice…Controlling prejudice reduction
practices are tempting because they are quick and easy to implement. They tell people
how they should think and behave and stress the negative consequences of failing to think
and behave in desirable ways…But people need to feel that they are freely choosing to be
nonprejudiced, rather than having it forced upon them.105
If we look at this from a wider lens, diversity training and bias-grooming are less about the
institution – the business or the court – defining the individual as they are about the individual
defining the law of that institution. (Note that, unlike in business, there is no comparable system
of grievance for jurors and actors in the court.) It tests the tensile strength of the institution to

Kaiser, “Presumed Fair,” at 7.
Not to mention the frustrating issue of, in the practical implementation of these techniques, the framing of “the
diversity issue” as problematic because of these groups, and that onus of righting these problems is placed upon
those demographics of interpersonal interactions.
104
See F. Dobbin and A. Kaley, “Why Diversity Programs Fail,” Harvard Business Review 94, 52-60 (2016).
105
L. Legault, quoted in “Ironic Effects of Anti-Prejudice Messages,” Association of Psychological Sciences, 6 July
2011.
102
103

Roderique, 27

serve the individual, to respond, and to be passionately attentive. Its calls for procedural and
systemic change are a result of equal engagement by the individual as by the institution 106. As
counterintuitive as it seems, it is by making jury training and bias-training voluntary, and by
getting a foot in the door to invite subjectivity and bias, that the jury stands a fighting chance at
efficacious civic representation and engagement. Voluntary bias interference instead reinforces
behavioral salience trends including subjective identification (contact hypothesis), self-efficacy
and -accountability measures, and domain identification in the simulated environment of the
court, versus prejudicial stereotyping 107. Indeed by preventing jury compositional manipulations
of any kind – even those that aim to replace a more biased juror with a lesser biased one – our
bias-grooming begins to resemble more of a taskforce108; there is no guarantee of fully
representational engagement, but we wedge the door open the smallest bit further.
In the years immediately following the AIJ, Washington State introduced its
“Understanding the Effects of Unconscious Bias” training video109, the country’s first implicitbias based instructional video addressed directly to jurors and mandated in both District houses
in Seattle and Tacoma. It is based on much of the same content of the AIJ, some of it lifted
directly, and draws particularly from those sections on jury selection and instructional dialogues.
The video beings: “It is the court’s goal in every jury trial to find jurors who will decide the case
before them without prejudice or bias…so that you can be sure you are making objective
decisions”110 (a parrot of AIJ’s proposed juror instruction111). It continues:

106

Devine, Jury, at 211-20.
Paluck and Green, “Prejudice Reduction,” at 345-57.
108
West, “12 Racist Men,” at 197-99.
109
See J.A. J. Coughenour, et al. “Understanding the Effects of Unconscious Bias,” U. S. District Court, Western
District of Washington video, 11:00, posted by The Marshall Project (2017).
110
Ibid at 0:17.
111
Diversity and Inclusion 360 Commission, American Bar Association, “Achieving,” at 22.
107

Roderique, 28

If and when we stop to consciously think about it, we might decide our initial [implicit
biases] don’t actually fit with the information we are being presented with and with what
we really know to be fair. 112
Alone this line flags problems with bias-grooming techniques. One, it mistakes implicit bias
again as an unintentional and accessibly cognitive phenomenon and assumes a noble
Dworkonian view of some objectively right answer or truth in regards to decision-making and
sentencing113. It grapples with prejudice here and throughout similarly to the interventional view
but offers no concrete means of intervention, instead encouraging (unaccountable) reflexive
meditation on one’s prejudices and behaviors. Two, it assumes that the individual is not only
aware, or can be made aware, of his implicit and explicit biases, but that he has the capacity to
place them in direct and thoughtful contrast to his conception of ‘right’ and just114, and to apply
that to naturalistic contexts (i.e., he is self-regulating his own racism, sexism, etc. because he
recognizes from the law a fundamentally more “right” prescribed subjectivity than his own 115.)
The individual juror is therefore expected to supply the court with an extralegal rationality of
logic; the juror is no longer the arbiter of guilt, he is the subjective and democratic standard by
which guilt is decided 116. It requires the individual to respond and be attentive to the law, rather
than vice versa (as above).
Well intentioned as it may be, the video’s sentiments erode further in its three tenants of
being an ‘unbiased’ juror: (1) “Know that unconscious bias exists and occurs for all of us”
(valid), (2) “Carefully examine our decisions and judgements as jurors” (this is valid so long as
it is limited to explicit decision-making and biases), and (3) “Question our decisions by asking
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whether they would be different if the witness, lawyer, or person on trial were of a different race,
age, or gender” (this is borrowed from the AIJ and exploits those same stereotyping mechanisms
that reinforce bias 117)118. “Understanding the Effects of Unconscious Bias” harkens back to those
issues of the interventional view and further reiterates the failings of examining one’s own biases
in an effort to eliminate them. The final tenant assumes perhaps too much of the juror in his
capacity to segregate his objectivity from his subjective and biased (though not necessarily
prejudiced) decision-making.
The ABA also supplies judges, public defenders, and prosecutors with similar training
videos; the “Hidden Injustice” series 119. While it is encouraging that these are considerably more
accurately informed than the IBT, they are worryingly more provocative, essentially taking two
steps back for each step forward (even more worryingly, the science provided is done so
exclusively by legal actors and scholars). The series has its own three tenants of being an
‘unbiased’ judge, arguably hedged too greatly on unreliable IAT evidence 120: humility (“it is
paradoxically only by being humble and recognizing that you are deeply fallible that you can
actually become more objective” 121), prudence (“[you] should be most on guard when [you] are
under pressure to decide quickly…be mindfully intentional about your equality” 122), and
intentionality (“if you are highly motivated to avoid discriminatory behavior and that motivation
doesn’t come from external requirements…that internal motivation does matter a lot” 123). “Bias
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on the Bench” befalls the same hazards as “Understanding the Effects of Unconscious Bias”:
“Implicit bias is a bit like an emotional reaction and you can detect that if you see it
happening…We all have implicit biases and unless we work hard to counter them they have the
potential of surfacing and effecting judgements that all of us make” 124. At the risk of again
reiterating the interventional view, the series sanitizes the cognitive and institutional realities of
implicit bias and assures a negligently and optimistically corrigible outlook.
In this blinkered approach to implicit bias, neither the ABA nor District Court require of
legal actors and the institution of law a comparable kind of accountability for any address of the
rampant and well-documented manipulations of jury compositions, systemic juror suppression,
voter oppression and access, cross-race-like effects that distort conviction rates, trends in crosssectional negative-retribution and positive-rehabilitation judgement rates, problematic policing
practices, and more. Their interventions reflect an increasingly better-informed view of implicit
bias, but even so are lack to long-term rigor to constitute any lasting cognitive, behavioral, or
structural change. Though “Understanding the Effects of Unconscious Bias” enjoyed a positive
reception District-wide, its mandate was brief: It was barred from voir dire in Thomas v.
Cannon125, another fatal instance of racially-motivated police brutality, on the basis of the video
being “simply too prejudicial” in the context of the case. Thomas affirms that that bias-grooming
techniques, however effective or ineffective they may or may not be to the juror in either a
situational or naturalistic context, are up against the bigger foe of courtroom economy and
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politics – they cannot be expected to stand firmly against, much less overcome, things so
systemic as prejudicially-motivated intrapersonal and interpersonal behaviors126. Aspirations to
objectivity are not immune to them, despite whatever their intention. Objectivity, together with
subjectivity, must be considered from a holistic perspective. The videos, the IBT and AIJ, and
resources like it, are the product of the law’s jumping on an oversold and under-scrutinized,
intensely particular filament of research on prejudice, and they reflect a glossy, palatable,
temptingly idealized (and irresponsible) account of implicit bias127.

More Harm Than Good
My greatest concern with bias-grooming is a fundamental and fundamentally personal
one that has been divided since the beginning in the science and evidence. I am of the
persuasion, defeating as it may be, that one cannot better his implicit biases; the individual
cannot control his biases or make them any less pervasive in his subjective experience. The best
the individual can do is reflexively modulate his thoughts and behaviors based on a sociocultural
contextualization (not his subjective experience of socioculture) 128. This is an argument for
malleability129, not resolution, and such behavioral change can occur absent ever a change in
prejudice itself130:
Altering [structural] associations would presumably have general, long-term
consequences, while contextual changes and behavioral strategies for altering expression
would have specific, short-term consequences…[We cannot currently know whether] the
effects [of bias-intervention] reflect situational short-term malleability or general, longterm change…The degree to which prejudice reduction persists after completion of the
126
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intervention is unknown…The existing literature provides solid evidence for implicit
prejudice malleability, but little and mixed evidence for “long-term” implicit prejudice
change.131
The frontiers of brain and social sciences – and I do realize it is at the emergent frontiers that this
occurs – reveals that in this present moment we are a people quantifiably more discriminatory,
more competent in our discrimination, quicker to judge on the basis of prejudices, and more
readily neurocognitively affected by matters of identity132. Our subjective experience of the
world is encroached upon by identities not our own (and, like our politics, it is of greater value to
conform to external identities to be objectively ‘right’ than to be engaged in our performative
subjectivity). I, we, stand little chance to legitimately effect our subjectivity and implicit
prejudices when we are combatting an overwhelming tide of cultural hyper-contextualization and
inescapable automatic stereotype activation 133.
Not to be mistaken, there is value in understanding the ways in which we are influenced
by bias, even at the most subterranean levels of consciousness; this is not to say that we cannot
or should not attend to our biases. There is also value in consciously examining how this
influence manifests in our explicit judgements, interactions, and decision-making134. I do not
deny that there could eventually be realized ways to become sincerely less discriminatory as the
science grows further 135, but there is little evidence now to suggest that this is accomplishable by
way of bias-grooming or diversity training (or indeed within the confines of the current scientific
knowledge of implicit bias)136. The adversarial system that is our objective model of justice
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seeks, by its own admission, objective truth in the pursuit of some gains that carry no requisite of
justness or fairness. It will be accomplishable by a considerable and consistent effort on the part
of the entirety of our legal system, our politics, our science, our media, our civic accountability
and dignity, everything that does and will motivate our biopsychosocial subjective experience. It
will be accomplishable when the transformation of the integrity of our subjective experience is
not degraded by our performance of it.

Conclusion
The best I can offer is entre into critical conversation: As law and science continue to
converge, I think there is much to be said of the ways in which we choose to move forward now,
most notably for the ways in which we give up the search for a normative objectivity in law and
instead take up the search for those mechanisms of bias – not prejudice – which could serve
justice more constructively. It is assured that implicit bias will not vacate the court so long as the
court remains a human endeavor, so it becomes necessary that there exists space within which
the law may thoughtfully and subjectively engage with bias; it must be reexamined the wider
implications of prejudice as they surface structurally and systemically. Beyond brain or legal
sciences, this is a challenge issued collectively, urgently, to legislation, cultural studies, politics,
industry, intersectional and minority projects, to everyone standing at the door of the law 137.
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